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RECENT CASES
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LEGAL ETHICS-EFFECT oF AGREEMENT To DIVIDE
FEEs WITH DISBARRED ATTORNY-A, an attorney, was handling a case *for a
client on a contingent fee basis. A was disbarred for offenses which had no
connection with the particular case. After disbarment, he arranged that B,
another attorney, be retained by the client to handle the case on the same con-
tingent basis. B agreed to divide the fee with A. Later, the client sought to
substitute another attorney for B. Held, that in effecting the substitution and
coming to the above agreement, A and B forfeited the lien on the cause of
action because B's arrangement to divide the fee with A violated the statute'
prohibiting an attorney from agreeing to pay a layman for obtaining cases for
him. Dudar v. Milef Realty Co., 227 App. Div. 279, 237 N.Y. Supp. 499 (1929).
Although generally referred to as a lien, the right of an attorney to have
costs and compensation due him secured out of the judgment or recovery in the
particular suit is fundamentally only a right to the equitable interference of the
court in his favor.2 It is recognized in most jurisdictions either by statute or
decision If the attorney cannot establish a sufficient equity in his favor, it
seems proper that the court should refuse the lien. 'An attorney who withdraws
from a suit without cause loses his inchoate right to a lien on the ultimate
recovery,' and an attorney who necessarily withdraws from a suit because he
has been disbarred is considered to withdraw without just cause, since it is his
own wrongful act which makes the withdrawal necessary.5 The conclusion that
A had lost his lien in this case therefore seems proper. The court refused to
allow B a lien because it considered his arrangement with A champertous.
Granting that an attorney should not be allowed a lien on a case obtained by
champertous methods,' was B's arrangement with A champertous? Laws against
IN. Y. CONs. LAws (Cahill 1923) 1389.
2In re Gillespie, i9o Fed. 88, 91 (N. D. W. Va. 1911) ; Adams v. Fox, 40
Barb. 442 (N. Y. 1863); McKelvey's Appeal, io8 Pa. 615 (1885); Horton v.
Champlin, 12 R. I. 550 (i88o). This lien, generally called a "charging lien", is
to be distinguished from the retaining lien which entitles the attorney to retain
in his possession for balances due him, any papers, money, etc., which come into
his possession in connection with the case for which the balance is owed or for
any other legal services. The chief value of the latter type of lien is in its
effect in embarrassing the client through the withholding o~f the papers until
the debt is paid; the attorney may not sell them to foreclose the lien. Rose v.
Whiteman, 52 Misc. 210, ioi N. Y. Supp. 1024 (i9o6) ; McKelvey's Appeal, ibid.
'it re Regan, 167 N. Y. 338, 6o N. E. 658 (I9OI).
'White v. Harlow, 7I Mass. 463 (1855); It re Dunn, 2o5 N. Y. 398, 98
N. E. 914, (1912).
'Davenport v. Waggener, 49 S. D. 592, 207 N. W. 972 (1926).
'Davis v. Sharron, 15 B. Mon. 64 (Ky. 1854). However the attorney may
recover from the client the value of his services in quantum inerit, Farrel v.
Betts & Betts, i6 Ala. App. 668, 81 So. i88 (i919) ; Rogers v. Samples, 207 Ky.
150, 268 S. W. 799 (1925) ; Brush v. Carbondale, 229 Ill. i44, 82 N. E. 252
(igo7). Contra: Orino v. Beliveau, 120 Me. 550, 113 At. 26o (1921) ; Roller
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champerty contemplate the prevention of purposeful stirring up of litigation.7
The particular statute invoked here 8 prohibited attorneys from splitting fees with
laymen for cases brought to them by laymen, but excepted agreements between
attorneys to divide between themselves compensation to be received. Although a
disbarred attorney is considered to be deprived of every privilege to which his
license had entitled him,9 it is at least questionable if he should be treated as an
ordinary layman in connection with the arrangement he makes for disposing of
cases which he received before his disbarment. The possibility of a recurrence
of the circumstances is sufficiently rare to justify an exception being made in
such a case without the fear of breaking down to any considerable degree the
bulwark of champerty law.
Bn.ILS AND NOTES-EFFEcT OF DISCOUNT PROVISIONS ON NEGOTIABILITY-
Defendant made an instrument, promising to pay $400 in one year, with privi-
lege of discharging it by payment of principal, less 5 per cent. if paid within 30
days. Held, that the note does not contain a promise to pay a sum certain in
money. Waterhouse v. Chotinard, 149 At. 21 (Me. 1930).
Though the requirement is axiomatic that to be negotiable an instrument
must be for a sum certain,1 the divergence of opinion as to the effect of various
stipulations affecting the amount has been pronounced The consequence of
only some of these frequently found provisions was settled by the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law.3 Among those not expressly covered by the statute
is the provision permitting a discount if paid before a certain date, or, on or
before maturity.' Recognizing that the purpose of certainty in sum is to make
ascertainable the monetary value of the instrument as currency at any given
v. Murray, 112 Va. 780, 72 S. E. 665 (1911). But the person who has solicited
the case for the attorney from the client may not recover anything from the
attorney. Ellis v. Frawley, 165 Wis. 381, 161 N. W. 364 (1917) (person solic-
iting was himself an attorney).
'Matter of Clark, 184 N. Y. 222, 232, 77 N. E. 1, 4 (igo6).
8 Supra note I.
9Danforth v. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, i1 N. W. lO21 (19o9); In re Thatcher,
83 Ohio St. 246, 93 N. E. 895 (1910).
'NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, I (2). Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434
(879) ; Cushman v. Haynes, 20 Pick. 132 (Mass. 1838); NORTON, BILLS AND
NOTES (4th ed. 1914) 74.
'BIGELOW, BLs, NOTES AND CHEQUES (3d ed. 1928) § 1O9 et seq.
The effect of alternative interest provisions, analogous to the provisions
under discussion, is variously viewed. Some hold the higher rate a penalty and
the sum certain, Smith v. Crane, 33 Minn. 144, 22 N. W. 633 (885). When
the alternative is valid, the usual rule is that there is sufficient certainty if the
amount due at any particular time may be computed, Clark v. Skeen, 61 Kan.
526, 6o Pac. 327 (19oo) ; Contra: Hegeler v. Comstock, I S. D. 138, 45 N. W.
331 (1890).
' NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, § 2.
'See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW ANNOTATED (4th ed.
1926) 17.
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time, all provisions for discount are considered by some authorities as rendering
the sum uncertain and the instrument non-negotiable.! Others hold that the
amount in such instruments is not so uncertain as to destroy negotiability.' It
is submitted that the correct position is that of a few courts which differentiate
between cases where the discount privilege is granted only if the instrument is
paid on or before maturity, and those where the privilege is existent only until
a given date.7 In the former, where the discount is allowed f paid on or before
maturity, there appears no objection to negotiability on the score of uncertainty
of sum. Till maturity the amount is definite, it being the stated sum, plus inter-
est, minus the discount. After maturity the larger amount may be treated as a
penalty, or as are provisions for attorney's fees and costs of collection in the
various states.8 In the latter situation, however, that is, where the discount
period continues till a stated date, the sum is indefinite, for, between the time
of its inception and the time of its maturity the instrument may be discharged
by the payment of either of two amounts. Until the period during which a
discount is allowed is over, the return value to a holder is uncertain. The
instant case, being in the latter category, therefore appears undesirable as a cir-
culating medium, and was so held.
CONFLICT OF LAWs-FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSF---CUSTODY OF MINOR
-Respondent lived with her children apart from her husband in North Carolina.
A juvenile court of that state issued a decree placing the children in a boarding
house in North Carolina. Respondent, without authority, carried the children
to Pennsylvania, where they lived together a year and a half. On habeas corpus
proceedings, the lower court ruled that the full faith and credit clause required
that the decree of the North Carolina court be given effect and that the children
be returned to that state. Held, that the North Carolina decree is not binding.
Cont. ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 148 Atl. 524 (Pa. i93o).'
'Way v. Smith, iii Mass. 523 (1837); Lamb v. Story, 45 Mich. 488, 8
N. W. 87 (1881) ; Nat'l Bank v. Feeney, 9 S. D. 550, 7o N. W. 874 (1897) ;
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. McCoy, 32 Okla. 277, 122 Pac. 125 (1912).
See BiGELow, loc. cit. supra note 2.
'Loring v. Anderson, 95 Minn. ioi, io3 N. IV. 722 (1905); Farmers Loan
& Trust Co. v. Planck, 98 Neb. 225, 152 N. W. 390 (915) ; Mansfield Saving
Bank v. Miller, 2 Ohio C. C. 96 (887) ; Harrison v. Hunter, 168 S. W. io36
(Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
'Capital City State Bank v. Swift, 29o Fed. 505 (E. D. Okla. 1923).
8 Loring v. Anderson, supra note 6. ". . . while there is a contingency
before the maturity as to whether the maker will pay it at maturity or before,
there is no contingency or uncertainty as to the amount to be paid in full dis-
charge of the note at maturity or at any time before, if maker elects to pay
before." BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 113.
'Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. McCoy, supra note 5; First Nat'l Bank v.
Watson, i55 Pac. 1152 (Okla. 1916) (under N. I. L.); Farmers Loan & Trust
Co. v. Devear, 2 Tenn. C. C. A. 366 (1911); see Fralick v. Norton, 2 Mich.
130 (I85I).
'Reversing 96 Pa. Super. 556 (1929).
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The instant case raises a two-fold problem. First, what elements supply
the jurisdiction requisite to a valid determination of the proper custody of a
child? Secondly, granted that such jurisdiction exists, what effect must be
given to a prior valid decree of a sister state? Jurisdiction to determine status
depends upon domicile.' This general rule applies to the custody of minors.'
An apparent anomaly is that such jurisdiction has been continued even though
the domicile has been changed.' The explanation is found in the view that cus-
tody of the child is analogous to a res. In proceedings in rem, removal of the
res from the state after jurisdiction has once been acquired cannot deprive the
court of its right to adjudicate. Similarly, the custody of the child is contin-
uously before the court of original domicile until the child becomes of age, and
the court may amend its decree until that time.' This doctrine finds practical
support in the difficulty, under present conflicting rules, of determining whether
the child's domicile has been changed.' However, there are contrary decisions
which give jurisdiction to the new domicile on the theory that it is the forum
most interested in the status of its citizens.7 Granted under this latter rule that
the state of new residence has jurisdiction, there then arises the problem of
the effect required to be given the decree of the former domicile under the full
faith and credit clause. Many courts treat the prior adjudication as conclusive
as to all legal rights up to the time of the decree, and only proof of a subsequent
material change of circumstances will allow the question to be reopened. The
contrary view argues that the full faith and credit clause is applicable only to
judgments settling property rights and does not limit independent disposition of
custody by the later court. This view in effect receives support in the instant
case, which pronounces the rule that the facts found in the former proceeding
are to be given full faith and credit; but the legal conclusion found by the prior
court on the basis of those facts is not binding, even though there is not the
'This is true as to divorce, legitimation, and adoption. GooDRICH, CoNFLCT
OF LAWS (1927) §§ 122, 136, 141; MINOR, CONFLICT OF LAWS (I90I) § 97 et seq.
3 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 2, § 305.
Stetson v. Stetson, 8o Me. 483, 15 Atl. 6o (1888) ; State ex rel. Nipp v.
District Court, 46 Mont. 425, 128 Pac. 59o (1912). It is to be noted that the
question has most frequently arisen in connection with divorce proceedings, but
it is submitted that the same principles are applicable where jurisdiction is
assumed for the sole purpose of determining proper custody.
'GOODRICH, The Custody of Children in Divorce Suits (1921) 7 CORN. L.
Q. I, at 7.
'For the complexities that enter into this phase of the problem, see GOOD-
RICH, loc. cit. supra note 5.
ilner v. Gatlin, 139 Ga. 109, 76 S. E. 860 (1912) ; Groves v. Bartow, lO9
Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919) ; BEALE, Progress of the Law (1920) 34 HARV.
L. REV. 57, 58. This is evidently the view taken by the instant case. There is
at least one court whose dictum would allow the state o f presence to determine
custody even though the children are domiciled elsewhere, De La Montanya v.
De La Montanya, 112 Cal. IOI, 44 Pac. 345 (1896).
' Milner v. Gatlin, supra note 7; State ex rel. Nipp v. District Court, supra
note 4.
'In re Bort, 25 Kan. 308 (1881) ; In re Alderman, 157 N. C. 507, 73 S. E.
126 (igi). The cases are collected in the dissenting opinion of Keller, J., in
the decision of the instant case by the Superior Court, supra note I, at 566.
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slightest change in situation other than change of residence." While this re-
striction of the applicability of the full faith and credit clause has found some
eminent judicial support, and has the merit of leaving the state of present resi-
dence unhampered in its disposition of its citizens, it seems as a matter of con-
struction to be an unjustified narrowing of the force of the constitutional pro-
vision which on its face presents no such exception.
CONSTTUTIONAL LAW-POwER OF CONGRESS OVER FEDERAL OFFIc moLDER
DESPITE INCIDENTAL EFFECT UPON STATE PaimAmiEs-The Federal Corrupt
Practices Act of r925 makes it a crime for a member of Congress to solicit or
accept from a Federal officeholder or employee contributions for "any political
purpose whatever."' Defendant was indicted under the act for receiving, while
a representative in Congress, a contribution from a Federal officeholder for the
purpose of promoting his candidacy for the nomination in the state primaries.
Held, that "political purposes" constitutionally includes state primaries. U. S. v.
Wursbach, decided by United States Supreme Court, U. S. Daily, Feb. 26, i930,
at 3628.
Most of the extensions of the governmental powers of the Federal govern-
ment into fields within the reserved powers of the states are commonly explained
by the doctrine that the validity of the exercise of a Federal power is not im-
paired by the fact that such exercise incidentally affects the subject-matter of
the state's jurisdiction. In Newberry v. U. S. it was decided that state pri-
maries were not subject to the regulatory power of the Federal government,' not
being such "elections" as were contemplated by Article I, Section 4 of the Con-
stitution.' This decision, however, means simply that the authority for Federal
interference with state primaries cannot be traced to this particular part of the
Constitution. It may be traced to other parts. Thus a state statute excluding
negroes from voting in primaries was held unconstitutional as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 Similarly, the source of the power exerted in the
statute in the principal case is "the power of Congress over the conduct of
officers and employees" of the Federal government.' The case may be regarded
as significant in that it opens up a way of escaping, in part, the limitations
20 148 Atl. 524, at 527.
143 STAT. 1053, 1073 (1925) ; 18 U. S. C. §208 (1928).
'256 U. S. 232, 41 Sup. Ct. 469 (192o).
'The various opinions in the Newberry case were not agreed as to whether
the primaries were subject to state regulation. Holmes, J., in the opinion in the
principal case, assumes they are subject to state regulation.
"'The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Rep-
resentatives shall be prescribed in each state by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to
the places of choosing Senators."
'Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446 (1927). See Note
(193o) 31 HARv. L. REv. 467.
'Holmes, J., in the opinion in the principal case.
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imposed by the Newberry case.' The next step would seem to be a statute
extending the prohibition of assessments upon Federal officeholders to all candi-
dates in primaries, whether they be already members of Congress or not.'
CORPORATIONS-PREiEMPTIVE RIGHT OF SHAREHOLDER WHERE N - SHARES
ARE ISSUED TO EFFECTUATE A MERGER-The majority of the shareholders of the
defendant trust company in order to accomplish a merger with a bank, voted to
issue new shares of stock at a specified valuation to acquire the assets and stock
of the bank, and amended the charter to allow the directors to deny preferential
subscriptions to the existing shareholders. The entire issue was necessary to
effectuate the merger. Plaintiffs, shareholders in the trust company, claim the
right to purchase a proportionate share of the new issue. Held, that plaintiffs
have no such right. Thorn et al. v. Baltimore Trust Co., 148 Atl. 234 (Md.
1930).
When new shares are issued by a corporation for the purpose of increasing
its cash assets, the existing shareholders are generally recognized to have a pre-
emptive right to purchase such shares in the proportion which their then hold-
ings bear to the then total outstanding stock. This right is secondary in char-
acter, being but a means of protecting the shareholder's proprietary or financial
interest and his proportionate voting power.' To this well established rule, an
exception has often been said to arise where the new 'shares are issued for the
purchase of property.' Until the decision in the instant case, however, there
has apparently been no case resting squarely on this proposition.3 Such courts
' Apprehension of such "evasion" led the lower court in deciding the instant
case to hold the statute inapplicable to such a set of facts: U. S. v. Wurzbach,
31 F. (2d) 774 (W. D. Tex. 1929).
' Such a statute would seem to be necessary if candidates already members
of Congress are not to be subjected to the disadvantage of not having such a
restriction applicable to their opponents.
'Miles v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 259 U. S. 247, 42 Sup. Ct. 483 (1922);
Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., 186 N. Y. 285, 78 N. E. io9o (i9o6) ; Glenn v.
Kittanning Brewing Co., 259 Pa. 510, 103 Atl. 340 (1918). If neither interest
is invaded, no preferential subscription is permitted. See also, Note (1928) 77
U. OF PA. L. REV. 256.
'BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS (1927) § 135; Morawetz, The Preimptive
Right of Shareholders (1928) 42 HARV. L. REV. 186, 196.
'In the often cited case of Meredith v. New Jersey Zinc & Iron Co., 55
N. J. Eq. 211, 37 Atl. 539 (1897), aff'd 56 N. J. Eq. 454, 41 Atl. 1116 (1897),
the court noted that at trial the corporation had offered to insure the sharehold-
er's right to purchase his proportion at par, and stated, at 542, that "in case the
corporation deprives the shareholder of his rights in this behalf, it is liable in
an action at law for damages," and, since the corporation was financially respon-
sible, this was no ground for equitable relief. The same court in a later opinion
rendered the Meredith case still less authoritative: Wall v. Utah Copper Co.,
70 N. J. Eq. 17, 30, 62 At. 533, 538 (1905). In Bingham v. Savings Invest-
ment & Trust Co., 14o Atl. 321 (N. J. 1928), affg 138 Atl. 659 (N. J. 1927), a
statute authorizing the absorbing corporation to issue to the merged corporation's
shareholders new shares in lieu of the latter's, was held to deprive the share-
holders of a preEmptive right. In Bonnet v. First National Bank, 24 Tex. Civ.
App. 613, 6o S. W. 325 (I900), the shareholder had failed to offer to subscribe
within a reasonable time.
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as have discussed this exception have stressed the financial advantages accruing
to the shareholders, particularly in mergers, and have subordinated, to the extent
of almost totally ignoring, the importance of the loss in proportionate voting
power. It has been urged' that there is no logical justification for accepting
the paramount importance of voting control where the shares are created for
cash and denying it where the shares are exchanged for property. The writer
submits that in the former bituation, where cash is sought, the source of such
consideration is of no moment to the corporation, and to permit the impairment
of the shareholders' voting power would be to condone an unnecessary evil.
Where, however, property is the consideration sought for the shares, the source
is of vital importance to the corporation.' The recognition of a preEmptive
right, in the absence of the usual waivers, would compel the issuance of shares
in excess of the amount required for the purchase of the property. In a field
where business efficiency is not lightly regarded, this distinction' thus seems a
desirable adjunct to an already flexible rule.
CoiPoRATIOxs-LIABILITY OF PARENT CORwOWaTIOx FOR THE TORT OF A SUB-
smlARY-The plaintiff's intestate was killed through the negligence of the engi-
neer of the West Jersey & Seashore Railway. The Pennsylvania Railroad
Company, in addition to owning 51 per cent. of the stock, practically dominated
and controlled the acts of the West Jersey & Seashore Railway. Held, that the
defendant railroad was liable on the ground that the subsidiary railroad was a
mere instrumentality of the defendant. Ross v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co. et al.,
148 Atl. 741 (N. J. 1930).
The cases are in hopeless conflict as to whether a parent corporation is
liable for the torts of its subsidiary.' It has been asserted that mere ownership
of stock is insufficient to hold the corporation liable but that there must be some
added element, such as management or supervision, which enables the parent
'Frey, Shareholders' Pre-emptive Rights (1929) 38 YALE L. J. 563, 579.
'The Stokes case, supra note i (preEmptive right recognized where new
shares were issued for cash to a person highly desirable as a shareholder), is
cited by Frey as illustrating the illogicality of the exception. Under the sub-
mitted "source" test, however, the case would be deemed to fall within the
exception, compelling a conclusion contrary to that reached by the court in that
case, and thus disposing of the alleged illogicality.
Aside from the considerations here discussed, the same qualifications as to
fairness of valuation, motive, etc., which encompass the issue of "cash" shares
should, of course, attach to shares created for property.
'Corporation held liable: Davis v. Alexander, 269 U. S. 114, 46 Sup. Ct. 34
(1925); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Cities Service Co., 281 Fed. 214 (D. C.
Del. 1922); Finnish Temperance Society v. Finnish Socialistic Pub. Co., 238
Mass. 345, 13o N. E. 845 (1921) ; Wichita Falls, etc. Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 53
Okla. 463, 157 Pac. 112 (1916).
Corporation not held liable: Mathews v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 6oKan. 11, 55 Pac. 282 (1898) ; Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., 244 N. Y. 84,
155 N. E. 58 (1926). See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co.,
141 Md. 67, 8i, i18 Atl. 279, 284 (1922).
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corporation to control the acts of the subsidiary.' Thus each question is resolved
into a factual problem as to whether or not the requisite elements of domination
exist. As yet no general test has been laid down by which such a problem may
be solved; on the contrary the courts, when confronted with the situation, have
used vague and loose language, basing recovery on the metaphor that the sub-
sidiary was the "instrumentality", the "adjunct", the "tool", or the "mouthpiece"
of the parent corporation, and that, therefore, by disregarding the corporate
entity, the parent corporation should be held liable.' Corporate entity, however,
is not a fiction but a legal privilege granted by the state.' It would, therefore,
seem that corporate entity should not be disregarded merely to hold the parent
corporation on vague generalities, but that liability should be predicated on
sound legal principles. Such controversies may well be decided on principles of
agency'; or, if there be no agency, but fraud on the part of the corporation
exists, the decision may be reached on the ground that the parent and the sub-
sidiary are joint tort feasors.' On the facts of the principal case, the decision,
which is essentially correct, might well have been rested on principles of agency.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-EXTRATERRITORIAL EFFECT OF DECREES OF UNRECOG-
Nizao GovENMENTs*-Exiled directors o'f a Russian banking institution sued
in the name of the corporation to recover deposits made with defendant bank in
New York previous to the Soviet revolution. Defendant set up that the plaintiff
corporation had been dissolved, its assets confiscated, and its liabilities cancelled
'Radio-Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 7 F. (2d) 432 (C. C.
A. 3d, 1925); Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht, 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519 (1924);
Pratt v. Bradner Co., 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633 (1924).
' See cases collected in Ballantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary
Corporation (1925) 14 CAL. L. REv. 12, 17, fn. 16; Wormer, The Veil of Cor-
porate Entity (1912) 12 COL. L. REV. 496, 5o2; Note (1919) 32 HARv. L. REv.
424, 428.
'Ballantine, op. cit. supra note 3, at 20. See Donnel v. Herring-Hall-
Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267, 28 Sup. Ct. 288 (i908).
'Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. v. Dupont, 128 Fed. 84o (C. C. A. 2d, 19o4);
Specht v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 154 Minn. 314, 191 N. W. 905 (1923);
Oriental Inv. Co. v. Barclay, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 543, 64 S. W. 8o (I9oi). See
Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry. Co., supra note I, at 94, in which Cardozo, J., said:
"The whole problem of relation between parent and subsidiary corporations is
one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to be
narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it. . . . Epithets . . . lead us to forget that the essential term
to be defined is the act of operation. Dominion may be so complete, interference
so obtrusive, that by the general rules of agency the parent will be principal and
the subsidiary an agent. Where control is less than this, we are remitted to the
tests of honesty and justice."
'Peckett v. Wood, 234 Fed. 833 (C. C. A. 3d, 1916).
*For a comprehensive treatment of the general subject, see Wohl, The Na-
tionalization of Joint Stock Banking Corporations in Soviet Russia (1927) 75
U. OF PA. L. REv. 385; ibid 527; ibid 622; Dicldnson, The Unrecognized Gov-
ernment or State in English and American Law (1923) 22 MICH. L. REv. 118;
Wright, Suits Brought by Foreign States With Unrtcognized Governments
(1922) 17 Am. 3. INT. LAW 742.
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by Soviet decree. Held, that since the decree emanated from an unrecognized
government, the plaintiff corporation was not dissolved but is still a juristic
person with capacity to sue. Petrogradsky Mejdunarodny Komnerchesky Bank
v. National City Bank, 253 N. Y. 23, 17o N. E. 479 (193o).
It is uniformly held that recognition is determined from acts or statements
of the political department of the government. The courts must follow the
political authorities and are conclusively bound by the executive's determination.'
An unrecognized government has no legal capacity to sue' and will even be
denied relief for a claim arising out of a transaction into which it has entered
seeking only to recover its own property fraudulently withheld3 When the
unrecognized government claims succession to property belonging to the former
government as against the latter, the recognized government will be successful.
The unrecognized government is immune from suit for confiscating the property
of the plaintiff within its territorial jurisdiction. Seizures by unrecognized
governments not made as the result of war will apparently not be upheld when
the property is found in the state refusing to recognize the captor,' unless the
plaintiff is a citizen of a state which has accorded recognition to the captor.7
Captures made on the high seas by unrecognized governments are valid when
made by recognized belligerents, or when made from the enemy by recognized
insurgents in pursuance of open and notorious war Recognition once awarded
is retroactive and validates all acts of the state from the date of its origin.' A
government, recognized or unrecognized, cannot by decree extinguish the liabili-
ties of a corporation so far as foreign creditors and their recourse to foreign
assets are concerned, as such decree could have no extra territorial effect 3 But
the unrecognized government may cancel the obligations of both domestic and
foreign corporations toward its own nationals (or their assignees) on contracts
'Rose v. Himeley, 4 Cranch 241, 272 (U. S. i8o8); Kennett v. Chambers,
14 How. 38 (U. S. 1852); Emperor of Austria v. Day, 3 De G., F. & J. 217
(Eng. 1861).
-'The Sapphire, ii Wall. 164 (U. S. 1871); Republic of Honduras v. Soto,
112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845 (1889) ; United States v. Wagner, L. R. 2 Ch. App.
582, 591 (1867). The Kerensky government of 1917 is the present recognized
government of Russia and may sue as such in our courts, Russian Government
v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 293 Fed. 133 (S. D. N. Y. 1923).
'R. S. F. S. R. v. Cibrario, 235 N. Y. 255, 139 N. E. 259 (1923). See also
(1923) 31 Yim L. JouR. 534.
' The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (D. C. N. Y. 1921) ; City of Berne v. Bank o~f
England, 9 Ves. 347 (Eng. 18o4).
'Wulfsohn v. R. S. F. S. R., 234 N. Y. 372, 138 N. E. 24 (1923) ; Nankivel
v. Omsk All Russian Government, 237 N. Y. 15o, 142 N. E. 569 (1923).
'Luther v. Sagor, [1921] i K. B. 456; [1921] 3 K. B. 532.
'Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Co., 33 F. (2d) 2o2 (S. D. N. Y.
1929).
'United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 61o, 634, 644 (U. S. 1818) ; The Divina
Pastora, 4 Wheat. 52, 64 (U. S. i8ig); O'Neill v. Central Leather Co., 87
N. J. L. 552, 94 At. 789 (1915).
IUnderhill v. Hernandez, I68 U. S. 250, i8 Sup. Ct 83 (1897) ; Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297, 38 Sup. Ct. 309 (1918) ; Luther v. Sagor,
[1921] 3 K. B. 532.
"° James v. Second Russian Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 248, 146 N. E. 369 (1925).
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made and to be performed within its territorial jurisdiction." Where the exiled
directors of a Russian corporation which had been dissolved by Soviet decree
sued in equity to compel the return to them of trust funds deposited with a New
York trust company, the court refused to allow recovery on the ground that the
defendant might have to pay again if sued elsewhere by the Soviet Republic in
some country where Soviet decrees were recognized as law.' The action in the
instant case being brought in law, this defense was not available to the defend-
ant, and the Soviet government being unrecognized could not be interpleaded."
Private property rights which have arisen under the enactments of an unrecog-
nized government will be given validity by the court when reason and justice so
demand and the public policy of the state is not outraged, provided that in so
doing, the judicial department does not encroach upon or interfere with the
political branch of the government 4 The present confusion, created by an
unprecedented delay in according recognition to the Russian government, is
producing a juristic situation that is likely to become more vexing as time
goes on.'
'Dougherty v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 236 N. Y. Supp. 673 (1929).
'Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 147 N. E. 703
(1925). But in Matter of Second Russian Ins. Co., 25o N. Y. 449, 166 N. E.
163 (I929), it was held that the directors of a Russian insurance company have
sufficient standing to petition the court for equitable relief regarding surplus
funds of the company held by the Superintendent of Insurance in liquidation
proceedings, to apply for the payment of foreign creditors, and to suggest other
means for disposition of the funds.
"3 253 N. Y. at 25, 17o N. E. 479, 485.
"Sokoloff v. National City Bank, 239 N. Y. 158, 166, 145 N. E. 917, 919
(1924) ; Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 240 N. Y. 149, 163, 147 N. E.
703, 707 (1925). "It may be said perhaps with sufficient accuracy that acts
necessary to peace and good order among citizens, such for example, as acts
sanctioning and protecting marriage and domestic relations, governing the
course of descents, regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, real and
personal, and providing remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other
similar acts which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must
be regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual though unlawful
government". Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 733 (U. S. 1868).
"In all cases where a de facto government functions without question, the
courts should admit this fact and give effect to the acts of such government
within its own territory. Titles and contracts depend upon the law of the situs,
and it can make no difference that the government of the situs is not recognized.
Protection should also be given to all persons who have acted under the author-
ity of, or in obedience to the laws or commands of such de facto state, and the
status of persons or corporations domiciled therein should, in general, be deter-
mined in accordance with its laws. The state itself should be immune from
suit. Its right, on the other hand, to succeed to property in the forum should
depend upon recognition. So should the immunity of its property there attached.
The right to sue should depend, not on recognition, but on the nature of the
action. If this be in any way political, suit should not be allowed; if merely
contractual, it should be." Fraenkel, The Juristic Status of Foreiqn States
(1925) 25 Cor. L. REv. 544, 569.
' "As the law now stands, the dispossessed owner cannot sue for conversion
the state which dispossessed him. He can, however, recover the seized property
if he can find it in some state which has not recognized the seizing state. For
instance, a purchaser of goods seized by Soviet Russia now has an unimpeach-
able title in England and none in the United States; now has a title in France
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PATENTS--"INVENTIONS'-CHANGE IN Foam OF ARTICLE WITH[OUTCH1ANGE
IN FuNcTioN-In an action for infringement of the patent on "Eskimo Pies", a
chocolate-coated frozen confection in brick form, the validity of the plaintiff's
patent was questioned. The defendant put in evidence an old recipe for "Ice
Cream Cannon Balls", a chocolate-covered frozen confection in ball form, which
had been published by one M fifteen years prior to the issuance of the plaintiff's
patent, and also a German patent for candy-coating liquids by a freezing proc-
ess issued to one T nine years before the plaintiff's patent. Held, that the
plaintiff's patent disclosed only a change in the form and was therefore not an
"invention" within the meaning of the patent statutes. Eskimo Pie Corp. v.
Levous, 35 F. (2d) 120 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929).
An exact definition of the term "invention" as used in the Patent statutes
has purposely been avoided by the courts. It is broadly defined as the product
of creative mental conception rather than of mere mechanical skill.' But these
terms are in themselves capable o f widely varying definition, so that the deter-
mination of whether a particular object is or is not an invention is largely a
question of fact.2 A patented thing must be a new and useful invention. But
novelty and utility alone do not make an article an invention. Improvement in
workmanship,' substitution of superior materials,' change in size or degree,'
application to new but similar purpose,' while very often resulting in articles or
processes of new and useful nature, are not generally considered to be patent-
able. A change in the form of an article may be invention if it involves a
change in the method of operation or of function or result.7 But a change of
form which is merely a matter of mechanical construction is not, except of
where a year ago he had none. Moreover, if the litigation can be prolonged
until recognition is accorded, a title theretofore bad will be validated. A rule
of law producing results so variable in time and space is entitled to little respect
and should not be persisted in." Fraenkel, op. cit. supra note 14, at 563.
'American Road Machine Co. v. Pennock & Sharp Co., 164 U. S. 26, 17
Sup. Ct I (1896) ; WALKER, LAW OF PATENTS (6th ed., 1929) 66 ff.
'Thompson Spot Welder Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 265 U. S. 445, 44 Sup. Ct.
533 (924).
'Western Willite Co. v. Trinidad Mfg. Co., i6 F. (2d) 446 (C. C. A. 8th,
1926).
'American Safety Device Co. v. Liebel-Binney Construction Co., 243 Fed.
575 (C. C. A. 3d, 1917). If the substitution of new materials produces different
properties, Archer v. Imperial Machine Co., 207 Fed. 81 (C. C. A. 2d, 1913) ;
or if it makes for more efficient action, King. v. Anderson, go Fed. 503 (C. C.
S. D. N. Y. i898) ; or if it results in new function, Potts v. Creager, 155 U. S.
597, 15 Sup. Ct. 194 (1895), it may amount to invention.
'Phillips v. Page, 24 How. 164 (U. S. i86o) ; Scofield v. Rodman Chemical
Co., 290 Fed. i69 (C. C. A. 7th, 1923) ; Young v. Burley, 200 Fed. 258 (C. C. A.
6th, 1912).
'Fox Typewriter Co. v. Corona Typewriter Co., 282 Fed. 502 (C. C. A.
6th, 1922).
'Winans v. Denmead, I5 How. 341 (U. S. 1853); Diamond State Iron Co.
v. Goldie, 84 Fed. 975 (C. C. A. 3d, 1898) ; Edison Co. v. U. S. Electric Light-
ing Co., 52 Fed. 300 (C. C. A. 2d, 1892) ; ROGERS, LAW OF PATENTS (1914) 13.
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course in patents of designs, invention! It therefore seems proper that the arbi-
trary or fanciful change in form of the coated confection, resulting in no
advancement in the state of an art well established by description in printed
publication 9 and foreign patent,"0 should not be construed as falling within the
class of improvements upon whose sponsors the law graciously imposes the
bounty of exclusive privilege of manufacture, use, and sale.
TORTS-NEGiGENcE-LIABILITY OF PARENT FOR TORTS OF MINOR C -an-
Defendant intrusted his minor son with an air gun with which the son intention-
ally shot the plaintiff thereby injuring him. Held, that the defendant is liable
only if he knew, or from facts within his knowledge should have known, of his
son's mischievous propensities and malicious disposition which would make it
probable that by supplying him with such a toy, injury would result to a third
person. Capps v. Carpenter, 283 Pac. 655 (Kan. I93O).
Under the ancient Roman law' as well as under the modern Civil law' a
parent is answerable for the torts of his minor child. The common law, on the
other hand, is emphatically opposed to this doctrine and follows rather the rule
that liability will not attach to a parent utterly without fault.' In order that a
parent may be held responsible in damages for injuries caused by his minor
children, he himself must be guilty of some culpable conduct proximately re-
sulting in the injury through the physical agency of the child.' When a ,father
8 Warner Co. v. Rosenblatt, 8o Fed. 540 (C. C. A. 7th, 1897) ; National
Harrow Co. v. Westcott, 84 Fed. 671 (C. C. N. D. N. Y. 1898); MACOMBER,
LAW OF PATENTS (2d ed. 1913) § 655.
SFrench v. Carter, 137 U. S. 239, II Sup. Ct. 90 (1893) ; Rosenwasser v.
Spieth, 129 U. S. 47, 9 Sup. Ct. 229 (i889). In determining the question of
invention, it is presumed that the patentee was fully informed of everything
which preceded his alleged invention whether such is the actual fact or not,
Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U. S. 485, 20 Sup. Ct. 708 (900).
" Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonnville Co., 270 U. S. 390, 46 Sup. Ct. 324
(1926). Novelty is not negatived by any prior patent or printed publication
unless the information contained therein is full enough and precise enough to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it relates, to perform the process
or make the thing covered by the patent to which it relates. WALKiER, op. cit.
supra note I, at 120.
'MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Pollock's ed. 19o6) 151.
' Toca v. Rojas, 152 La. 317, 93 So. Io8 (1922) ; LA. REv. CIV. CODE (Mer-
rick's 3d ed. 1925) art. 2318; CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA (Johnson's 2d ed.
1923) art. 1054 (liable unless parent can show absolute inability to prevent in-
jury); HAWAIIAN CIVIL CODE § 1125 (construed to make parent liable only
when child itself would have been liable, Day v. Day, 8 Hawaii 715 (189I).
'Griffin v. Russell, 144 Ga. 275, 87 S. E. IO (1916) ; Bunting v. Goldstein,
283 Pa. 356, 129 AtI. 99 (1925) ; Norton v. Payne, 281 Pac. 991 (Wash. 1929);
SALMOND, TORTS (7th ed. 1928) 85.
'Dickens v. Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356 (1920) ; Ringhaver v.
Schleuter, 23 Ohio App. 355, 155 N. E. 242 (1927); BuRnIcK, TORTS ( 4th ed.
1926) § 121.
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gives 5 or permits a minor child to have easy access to' a dangerous instru-
mentality, or with knowledge of the vicious nature of his child fails to control
or admonish the child as to proper deportment,7 or voluntarily intrusts him with
an instrument not ordinarily dangerous but rendered so because of some abnor-
mal characteristic of the child,' then the parent may be said to be negligent and
consequently liable for the natural and probable consequences of his conduct. It
seems, however, that a child's possession of a dangerous instrumentality with
the permission of his parent will not impose legal responsibility on the latter for
every injury caused by the child with the aid of the particular dangerous device.
Liability should result only if the injury is within the scope of the risk to be
guarded against in giving a child of his age and nature an instrument of that
type? In other words, the injury must arise from the risk to prevent which a
duty attached to the parent and the breach of which constituted the negligence.
Thus if a firearm is intrusted to a child of tender years, the parent will be
answerable only for injuries resulting from the shooting of the gun (the risk
which it was his duty to prevent and which made his act negligent) and not for
harm which is caused by the child's poking a person in the eye or dropping it on
another's foot (these risks not being such as to make the parent negligent).
When a parent gives a child an ordinarily harmless instrument, e. g. an air gun,"o
in all probability he will be accountable only for such damage as is caused by
the child's abnormal trait the knowledge of which should have forewarned the
parent not to give the -particular toy to the child. So if a child, otherwise
docile, has the peculiar characteristic of shooting at birds or other animals and
has never been known to have like tendencies toward people, a parent will not
be subjected to liability for injuries to a person." The proposition of law as
'Meers v. McDowell, iio Ky. 926, 62 S. W. 1013 (igoI) ; Sousa v. Irome,
219 Mass. 273, io6 N. E. 998 (914).
'Vallency v. Rigillo, 91 N. J. L. 3o7, 1O2 Atl. 348 (1917); Salisbury v.
Crudale, 41 R. I. 33, Io2 Atl. 731 (1918); Sullivan v. Creed, 2 Ir. Rep. 317
(i9o4), reprinted in BOHLEN, CASES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (2d ed. 1925) i9o.
7 Norton v. Payne, supra note 3; (1930) 28 MIcH. L. REv. 627.
'Davis v. Gavalas, 37 Ga. App. 242, 139 S. E. 577 (1927) (velocipede);
Archibald v. Jewell, 7o Pa. Super. Ct. 247 (1918) (air gun) ; Bebee v. Sales,
32 T. L. P- 413 (i916) (air gun); (1928) 13 ST. Louis L. Rxv. 16o. This rule
is also true where one intrusts a harmless device to a stranger known to be
incapable of properly using it, Mitchell v. Churches, iig Wash. 547, 2o6 Pac.
6 (1922).
I See TERRY, ANGLo-AmERICAN LAW (0884) §§ 528 et seq.; GREN, RATION-
ALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (927) I95, i96: "But was this sort of hazard pro-
tected against by the rule which . . . (was) violated." Compare liability of
carrier for negligent delay in regard to injuries resulting from acts of God,
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Mullin, 7o Fla. 450, 70 So. 467 (915); Merritt
Creamery Co. v. Atchison etc., Co., 139 Mo. App. 149, 153, 122 S. W. 322, 323
(i9o9) : "Though a party be negligent in transporting freight, he is not liable
for every misfortune which befalls it unless it can be connected with the negli-
gence." (Italics ours.) See GREEN, op. cit. supra at 29: "But is the risk of
encountering such phenomena within the scope of the rule which makes the
delay a wrong?"
" Craddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225, 5o N. W. 135 (i89i).
" Compare liability of owner of vicious domestic animal, the rule being that
the owner will be answerable where there is notice of such facts that would
indicate a disposition to commit injuries substantially similar to that which
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stated by the court in the principal case was therefore undoubtedly correct. A
parent should be liable for injuries which he could foresee would result from
his minor child's malicious disposition of which he had or should have had
knowledge, which injuries he failed to prevent by proper control of the child or
which he induced by giving the child instruments with which it might carry out
its mischievous purposes.
TRUSTS-CHARITABLE PURPOSEs-TRusTS FOR RELIGIOUs UsEs-Testatrix
in her will made a residuary bequest to the vicar of a church "for such objects
connected with the Church as he shall think fit". Held, (one judge dissenting),
that the bequest was a valid charitable bequest. In re Bain [193o] I Ch. 224.
One of the principal divisions of charitable trusts includes those created for
the advancement of religion, which are enforced by courts of equity because of
the public interest that they advance.1 A frequent type of bequest is one to a
designated church without any declaration of trust or use. Such gift, being
considered to be for the purposes for which the church has been created, is held
to be a valid charitable trust.2 Gifts for religious uses include within their
scope such varied purposes as gifts for the erection of a church,' the aid of
missionary societies,' the support of widows and children of ministers of a
church,' the preaching of the gospel,' the propagation of sacred writings,' and
caused the injury, and if there is knowledge of one mischievous propensity and
injury results from another, liability will not arise, Emmons v. Stevane, 77
N. J. L. 570, 73 Atl. 544 (igo8) ; Feldman v. Selig, 11o Ill. App. 130 (1903)
(not sufficient to allege dog was known to bite, must show a disposition to bite
mankind and not merely animals where injury is to mankind); Swanson v.
Miller, 130 Ill. App. 2o8 (19o6) (knowledge that dog chases and barks at boys on
bicycles not such as to hold owner liable for dog biting and attacking a horse) ;
Eastman v. Scott, 182 Mass. 192, 64 N. E. 968 (I9O2) (kick while in stable not
sufficiently similar to kick while in harness) ; Cockerham v. Nixon, 33 N. C. 269
(I85o) (no liability where bull gores man when it had been known to gore ani-
mals); RoBSON, TRESPASSES AND INJURIES BY ANImALs (1915) 89 et seq.;
SALMOND, op. cit. supra note 3 at 493; SHERMAN & REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (6th
ed. 1913) § 631. Cf. also McDowall v. The Great Western Ry., [1903] 2 K. B.
331 (knowledge that boys played with freight cars held no negligence where
boys released brakes and injured plaintiff when they had never done it before).
'People v. Braucher, 258 IIl. 604, IOI N. E. 944 (1913); Board of Educa-
tion v. School District, 21 N. M. 624, 157 Pac. 668 (1916); BOGERT, TRUSTS
(1921) 204; 2 PERRY, TRUSTS (7th ed. 1929) § 701.
'Bates v. Schillinger, 145 Atl. 395 (Me. 1929) ; McAlister v. Burgess, 161
Mass. 269, 37 N. E. 173 (1894); McNeilly v. First Presbyterian Church, 243
Mass. 331, 137 N. E. 691 (1923); Royer v. Potter, 94 Neb. 280, 143 N. W. 299
(1913) ; It re Garrard, [19o7] I Ch. 382.
'Gagnon v. Wellman, 78 N. H. 327, 99 Atl. 786 (1917).
'Martinson v. Jacobson, 2oo Iowa 1054, 205 N. W. 849 (1925); Hinckley
v. Thatcher, 139 Mass. 477 (1885); Cummings v. Dent, 189 S. W. 1161 (Mo.
1916).
Sears v. Attorney General, 193 Mass. 551, 79 N. E. 772 (1907).
'Rhodes v. Yater, 27 N. M. 489, 202 Pac. 698 (1921).
'Thornton v. Howe, 31 Beav. 14 (1862).
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gifts "for the service of God".' Once the court has decided that a valid religious
purpose exists, it is faced with the further difficulty of determining whether the
words of the donor are so broad or vague that they authorize the application of
the fund to non-charitable purposes. If the language permits the use of the
trust res for non-charitable uses, the trust will not be upheld even if it does
include charitable purposes.' Accordingly, a gift to a trustee to such uses as
the trustee may judge the most conducive to the good of the religion in the
diocese has been declared void because it includes within its terms gifts that
might be neither charitable nor religious. This does not appear to be a logical
result, since if the gift in general furthers the purposes of religion, that should
be sufficient to establish its charitable nature. In the principal case a majority
of the court upheld the gift on the ground that "objects connected with the
Church" included only ecclesiastical purposes and not objects of the parish, such
as a Young Men's Club, which was one of the church purposes. In sustaining
the gift the court was more liberal than an English court twenty years earlier
which declared that a gift to an Archbishop to be distributed by him "between
such charitable, religious, or other societies, institutions, persons, or objects in
connection with the Roman Catholic faith in England as he shall in his absolute
discretion think fit" was void because the trustee could by the will give the fund
to objects neither charitable nor religious." While the principal case seems to
reach the correct result, it is submitted that the court does so by unnecessarily
limiting the intention of the testator to ecclesiastical purposes. A church may
have parochial as well as ecclesiastical purposes, but these are only incidental to
the main aim of religious worship, and since they advance the interests of the
church they should be considered religious purposes and therefore charitable.
WnILS-MISDESCRI"O OF DEVISED PREMisEs-Testatrix bequeathed "my
lots at Long Beach #59-61, on block #59," to her brother Michael, who is sole
devisee. Testatrix owned lots #6o and #61, but not #59, on said block.
Held, that lots #6o and #61 were devised to Michael. In the Matter of the
Estate of Walsh, 135 Misc. 589 (N. Y. 1929).
Ever since the Statute of Wills in 154o, and the Statute of Frauds in 1677,
decreed that devises of land, save in writing, were inoperative, there has been
little accord as to the extent and scope of the judicial power to rectify mistakes
in wills1 Courts have been torn between conflicting desires, on the one hand,
to enforce the statutes, and on the other to carry out the obvious, though legally
81' re Darling, [1896] I Ch. 5o. A bequest "for the advancement of
Christ's kingdom on earth" was held valid as a religious trust. Contra: In re
Ford's Estate, 144 Minn. 454, 175 N. W. 913 (1920).
'Morice v. Bishop of Durham, IO Ves. 521 (1805); Dunne v. Byrne, [1912]
A. C. 407.
'o Dunne v. Byrne, supra note 9.
int re Davidson, [19o9] i Ch. 567; cf. De Camp v. Dobbins, 31 N. J. Eq.
671 (1879).
'PAGE, WILus (2d ed. 1926) § 173.
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unexpressed, intention of the testator. It is generally said that courts, either of
equity or probate, have no power to correct or reform wills" although in many
instances the same result has been reached by "construction" or "interpretation"
of the instrument within its four corners. But the cases, in which a testator
inaccurately describes premises he intends to devise, seem uniformly open to
correction under the doctrine "falsa demonstratio non nocet".3 These cases hold
that the erroneous part of the description may be stricken out when what is left
in the will fairly identifies and describes the premises. This theory is usually
explained on the ground that if the testator uses word indicating an intent to
bequeath his property, and in fact describes land not his property, a latent
ambiguity exists, which may be removed by striking out the erroneous descrip-
tion.' But if the will lacks words indicating an intent to bequeath property then
owned by the testator, no ambiguity exists, since the testator may have intended
to acquire, thereafter, the described premises.' A few courts, however, hold
that an ambiguity exists even when no words like "my property" or similar
expressions are used, since it may be assumed, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, that a man intends to devise his property.7 Correction of the mistake
has also been achieved by those courts which deem it their purpose and duty to
carry out the meaning attached by the testator to his words, notwithstanding the
words' accepted or usual meaning, thereby construing and moulding the will to
conform to the subjective intent of the testator8 Some of these courts, how-
ever, have limited this doctrine to those instances where the testator, in his life-
time, had been accustomed to refer to the bequeathed premises by the testa-
mentary name or description.' In opposition to the doctrines permitting refor-
mation in these cases, it has been maintained that to substitute the allegedly
intended premises for the described premises is a violation of the statutes, and
-I SCHOU.aR, WILLS (6th ed. 1923) § 249: "The decisions cannot be recon-
ciled, but we may lay down as the weight of authority that equity cannot reform
a will."
' See cases infra notes 4, 6, 7. For discussion see 6 L. R. A. (N s) 967
(19O7).
' Patch v. White, 117 U. S. 2io, 6 Sup. Ct. 617 (i886) ; Riggs v. Meyers, 2o
Mo. 997 (i855) ; Emmert v. Hayes, 89 Ill. i6 (1878).
'See Patch v. White, supra note 4, at 214; Kales, (I919) 2 IL. L.
BuL.. 175.
6Kurtz v. Hibner, 55 Ill. 514 (i87o), criticized by Redfield, C. J., in (1861)
I U. OF PA. L. REv. 93; Sherwood v. Sherwood, 45 Wis. 357 (1878); Lynch's
Estate, i42 Cal. 373, 75 Pac. io86 (19o4).
l Chambers v. Watson, 56 Iowa 676, io N. W. 239 (1881); Wilmes v.
Tierney, 187 Iowa 39o, 174 N. W. 271 (1919). See also (1920) 33 HARV. L.
REV. 467.
'Tilton v. American Bible Society, 6o N. H. 377 (188); Re Jodrell, 44
Ch. D. 59o (189o) ; WIGRAM, WILLS (2d Amer. ed. 1872) 53. See also 4 WIG-
moRE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2462 for an argument against the rule that a
plain meaning cannot be disturbed.
I Myers v. Sarl, 2 E. & E. 3o6 (Eng. I86O) ; see Chambers v. Watson, supra
note 7, at 677, I N. W. at 240: "A devise of a thing by any name, ...
however different the name used in the will may be from the true name of the
thing, . . . . is a good devise, provided that it be shown that the name used
was one by which the testator was accustomed to designate the thing . .
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the substitution of a new will for the will of the testator?0 The instant case
presents no difficulty if the dash between the numbers is read as "to", in which
case the will devises lots #59, #6o, and #6r. The bequest therefore would then
merely ,fail as to lot #59, which the testatrix never owned. If the dash is read
as "and", a problem of rectification arises. The conclusion reached by the New
York court is in harmony with the weight of authority. It is submitted, how-
ever, that the modus operandi of the courts in these cases should more accurately
be classified as "reformation" or "correction", and not as "construction" or
"interpretation"."
"0 Kohn, On the Statute of Wills-Its Real Significance and Its Continued
Perversion by Courts (1898) 37 U. OF PA. L. REv. 545.
"Horner, (1919) 2 IL L. BuLL. 175; ibid. 293.
